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Insurance and Cultural Perspectives on Katrina 
By Jeffrey E. Thomas* 
I want to start with a photograph. I want to be a little bit interactive 
here, and get your reactions to this photograph. I looked at hundreds of 
pictures related to Katrina trying to find a picture that would generate an 
interesting narrative question—sort of what is going on? So, this is the 
picture that I chose. I actually paid a licensing fee so I can have this picture 
without AP emblazoned over the front of it, so it does not look silly. This is 
an actual news photograph that was put on the news line. I do not know 
what papers picked it up and ran it, but it is from Katrina. It is an actual 
narrative that comes from that disaster. So, what do you think it shows? 
What this process is doing is allowing you to reveal to me your narratives 
about what goes on and the history is of Katrina. 
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Audience Member 1:  The white gentlemen in the blue. He seems to 
be kind of uniformed and he is in the lead, and he has a cell phone clipped 
on, so I kind of see him, knowing the context of this, an insurance guy, and 
the African American gentlemen, who is just kind of coming along and 
looking pretty bummed out at what he sees. 
Thomas:  Okay, all right, very good. Other thoughts? 
Audience Member 2:  Perhaps the guy in blue is in some official 
capacity. The guy with the white shirt on is a volunteer. 
Thomas:  Okay, could be, very good. What does it tell you about 
racism in Katrina?  I mean, that’s the topic of this symposium. And, we 
have this historical background that’s really quite compelling of what’s 
happened in disasters historically. Is this a racial narrative from this 
picture? Or, can you see—do you believe that there is a possible racial 
interpretation of this? 
Audience Member 3:  Well, you have two people of different races 
that sort of look like they are engaged in some joint endeavor. 
Thomas:  Okay, so it looks like there is collaboration, perhaps, going 
on.  
Audience Member 4:  I think there is a general disparity with the 
appearance and demeanor. The white gentleman is better dressed; he is 
being assertive. The other guy looks like he has been in the muck and he’s 
cleaned up. He’s down and depressed and he’s looking across at a slab that 
looks like it used to be his home. 
Thomas:  Okay. Okay. And so what does that tell you about, sort of, 
racial issues?  
Audience Member 4:  The natural inference that we want to draw 
when looking at this is that the roles aren’t reversed. That, when looking at 
it, the guy with the mud boots, with his pants tucked into them, just lost his 
house and the other guy with the clipped-on phone and more assertive 
clothing is kind of in an authority role. 
Thomas:  Okay, you can read as sort of—it’s not fair to call it racism, 
but there’s this sort of disparity of power. And there’s sort of a dictum 
orientation that we can see or practically read into the picture with respect 
to the African American man. 
The picture is—we are pretty close to what it actually is—this is from 
the Ninth Ward in New Orleans, which was 98% African American. It was 
at the huge epicenter of disaster, and was the focus of a lot of racial 
discussion, racial concerns. The gentleman in blue is a FEMA volunteer, 
but is a paid volunteer. So he does have some authority, but he is not a 
government official. That goes back a little bit to the theme of Americans 
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helping each other out and in the positive sense, this shows a crossing of the 
racial line because there is a white volunteer helping an African American 
victim. The earlier picture of Katrina that Marian showed, I thought was 
really interesting because I was not sure what the narrative was. But, it was 
interesting to see that there were three or four African American men that 
looked to me like they were carrying an injured woman. Then, there were 
all these people behind the barricades. I am not really sure what the timing 
was, or what the picture was about exactly. But, it is a different kind of 
picture than this because it shows race in a different way. 
What is my point of this? The point is to try to understand the 
narratives. Try to figure out what the stories are, because those narratives 
are the way that we, as humans, create meaning. The cultural approach to 
things is to understand our way of organizing the world and creating 
meaning for ourselves. Racism is a big piece of that, and it’s a piece that we 
are trying to fix or change in certain ways. What I thought I’d do is start 
with the insurance narratives, and work into some of the racial issues. From 
there, go to the cultural narratives. 
From an insurance standpoint, homeowner insurance is archetypal 
insurance. The essential notion of insurance is risk transfer and risk 
pooling. Property insurance began because of big fires, like the fires that 
happened in San Francisco, in Chicago, and in London. So, fire insurance 
was the predecessor to typical homeowners insurance today. Its purpose is 
to allow us to manage our risk as homeowners. Homeowners could pay a 
little bit into a fund, that fund can be pooled, invested, and then when 
somebody has a loss, the pool, the fund, will pay for the homeowner’s risk. 
So it is a very useful device for managing risk, and was something that was 
present in Katrina. When Katrina occurred, it created enormous pressure on 
the insurance system because of the scope and magnitude of the losses—
and I will show you the slide in just a moment—Katrina losses were the 
largest losses (the largest insured losses) we have ever had. They dwarfed 
Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge Earthquake by a two to three-fold 
factor. 
Overall, the narrative is that the insurance system worked pretty well. 
The problem was, from a racial standpoint, that many people of color did 
not have insurance or they did not have adequate insurance. The limitations 
that there were on the insurance system in Katrina were an absence of 
insurance coverage, and this whole issue of how to deal with floods and 
with water. 
Katrina, if you combine the private insurance money with the flood 
insurance money, was 57 billion dollars in insured losses. September 11th 
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was right about 36 billion. Hurricane Andrew, in 2009 dollars, was like 
twenty-two billion.1  You can see by a factor of two, almost three, that 
Katrina was really enormous. There has been some criticism of insurance 
companies that they were not able to pay, that they must be too greedy, that 
they were making too much money. But, in fact, they were able to pay. 
Here is the quick story of the insurance successes. 
There was 40 billion dollars paid by private insurers to 1.7 million 
claimants.2  And, this is not just in Louisiana. This is also including 
Mississippi. Ninety-five percent of claims were settled within a year.3  
According to the Insurance Information Institute, they believe that less than 
2 percent of homeowner claims were disputed and went to mediation or 
court.4  And, in a survey that was done, eighty-nine percent of homeowners 
in Louisiana were satisfied with their insurance company.5  Eighty-two 
percent were satisfied with their settlement.6  There is still some sort of 
dissatisfaction—certainly some racial disparity to be discussed. But on the 
whole, it is actually pretty good. 
There are two reservations. One is the flood problem. Most private 
insurance policies exclude flood from their coverage.7  The reason for that 
is because the losses in a flood are enormous. Like the 1927 Mississippi 
Flood— it covered so much land and those risks are all correlated, they all 
happen at the same time, they are not random. If I had a house fire, that’s 
kind of random, so it is easier to pool that risk. But if a whole section burns 
down, or a whole area is flooded, those risks are correlated, and so it makes 
it a lot harder to underwrite.8 
The solution was that flood insurance was available through the 
national flood insurance program, a federal program. The problem, though, 
is that less than sixty-five percent of those in Katrina had flood insurance.9  
                                                                                                     
 1. Ins. Info. Inst., Hurricane Katrina:  2010 Fact File 3 (2010). 
 2. Ins. Info. Inst., Hurricane Katrina:  2007 Fact File 1 (2007). 
 3. Id.  
 4. Id. 
 5. Douglas R. Richmond, Insurance and Catastrophe in the Case of Katrina and 
Beyond, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 49, 50 (2007).  
 6. Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 2. 
 7. See generally, Kenneth S. Abraham, The Hurricane Katrina Insurance Claims, 93 
VA. L. REV. 173, 174 (2007) (discussing that most policies exclude flood damage from their 
coverage). 
 8. See Howard Kunreuther, Correlated Risk, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUANTITATIVE 
RISK ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT (Edward L. Melnick & Brian S. Everitt eds., 2008). 
 9. Richmond, supra note 5, at 56.  The original presentation stated that less than sixty 
percent of those in Katrina had flood insurance, while the actual number was sixty-five 
INSURANCE AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 61 
This number is very, very soft. We are not really sure what the numbers are. 
I saw one quote from the insurance commissioner of Louisiana said twenty-
nine percent.10  Another study said that it was about forty percent,11  and 
then another study said it was about sixty-five percent.12  So, the highest 
number I saw was sixty-five percent, but it’s much more likely to be lower 
than that. I think that’s a generous number. 
So, that’s a lot of people without coverage, because they cannot get it 
through private insurance, and they didn’t get it through the national flood 
insurance program. The reason they didn’t is because they just didn’t buy it. 
It wasn’t that it was unavailable or it wasn’t hard to get or expensive. It’s 
actually subsidized. Nevertheless, there was another seventeen billion 
dollars of flood insurance payments made by the national flood insurance 
program.13  And, there was litigation about whether the exclusion for floods 
was enforceable or not. I won’t bore you with the details, but the bottom 
line is a bunch of people made this argument, and they lost.14  The insurers 
won,15  and the exclusion for floods is very long established.16 
It was really quite clear and it was not that surprising. Except, that 
there was all this public policy talk because of the disaster, but it wasn’t 
surprising that the insurers won. So the insurance story is:  homeowner 
insurance worked pretty well for those who had it, flood insurance worked 
well for those who had it, but a lot of people did not have it. They tried to 
use the courts to get flood coverage, and they were unsuccessful, so there is 
                                                                                                     
percent). 
 10. Percentage of Homes with Flood Insurance Back to Pre-Katrina Levels, 
WWLTV.COM EYEWITNESS NEWS, http://www.wwltv.com/news/floodinsurancecoverage 
lagging122904069 .html (last visited Mar. 1, 2013) (“We, pre-Katrina, had 29 percent of our 
properties insured for flood.”) (quoting Louisiana Insurance Commissioner, Jim Donelon) 
(on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 11. La. Commissioner Wants 100% Participation in Flood Insurance Program, 
INSURANCE J., June 21, 2007, www.insurancejournal.com/news/southcentral/2007/06/21/ 
81020.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2013) (“He said only 40 percent of the victims of Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita in his state had flood insurance . . . .”) (quoting Louisiana Insurance 
Commissioner, Jim Donelon) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
 12. Richmond, supra note 5, at 56. The original presentation stated that less than sixty 
percent of those in Katrina had flood insurance, while the actual number was sixty-five 
percent. 
 13. See id. 
 14. See id. at 58–66. 
 15. See id. at 65. 
 16. See Home Ins. Co., N. Y. v. Sherrill, 174 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1949) (holding that 
exclusions for water damage are valid). 
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a gap in coverage. The response, the ultimate bottom line, is that those who 
are uninsured can rely on government aid—FEMA, some sort of disaster 
relief, that becomes the default that people move to if they cannot get 
insurance assistance. 
So what about the FEMA story? The FEMA story is really a pretty bad 
story. I’ll just give you a few quick highlights of it. First, a big problem was 
a lack of infrastructure and a lack of processes for claims management, and 
that caused significant delay. So, you have millions of claims, and 
insufficient staff who work for FEMA to handle such claims.17  The scope 
of the problem, the expertise that is needed, just isn’t there. Insurance 
companies, they do this day in and day out. They are very able to marshal 
and train people to go in and have tents set up and do claim adjusting on the 
ground. FEMA was not at all ready to do that. FEMA had taken over the 
flood insurance program relatively recently, and FEMA had been moved 
into Homeland Security. So, there were a lot of accountability problems, 
there were communication problems, and it was unclear who was in 
charge.18  That resulted in delays.19 
There were also problems involved with incentives. So, if FEMA is 
slow, what difference does it make? I suppose that some guy might lose his 
job, but it’s like “I’m a government employee, I’m here doing a job. I got 
ten thousand claims I’m trying to manage. Really, fire me and hire 
somebody else. Go ahead.” There is not the right kind of incentive for the 
government to respond in the way that the insurance companies have the 
incentive to try to keep their customers happy—to try to be well-recognized 
and to sell more insurance. 
Of course it led to enormous fraud, waste, and feuds that happened 
through the system. So the GAO [Government Accountability Office] did a 
study, and found tens of millions of dollars were wasted.20  They found 
terrible common examples of double payments and all kinds of fraud and 
abuse.21  And, it is because they did not have training or the infrastructure—
                                                                                                     
 17. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-300, HURRICANES KATRINA 
AND RITA DISASTER RELIEF:  CONTINUED FINDINGS OF FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE 152 
(2007). The original text included a reference to “35 employees in the insurance 
department,” which was an imprecise and casual way of referring to being short-staffed.  
 18. H.R. Res. 437, 109th Cong. (2006) (discussing problems in the Bipartisan 
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina). 
 19. See id. 
 20. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-300, supra note 17. 
 21. See id at 17–26.  
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there’s this huge disaster they were trying to address without the tools to do 
so.22 
That leads to this question about the racial narrative, and how that 
interfaces with insurance and with FEMA. So the black communities, such 
as the Ninth Ward, bore a greater burden, and part of that has to do with the 
segregated nature of housing, part of it has to do with poverty, part of it has 
to do with the cost of housing, and so forth.23  But it is quite clear, as a 
factual matter, that there was a great burden borne by black communities.24  
The second part of the narrative is that people believe, and there were 
accusations, and there is probably some truth to the notion, that some of 
these problems were due to race—it was caused by race; it was racism.25  
The third part of the narrative as I have seen it in some of the commentary, 
and this journal had a symposium in 2007 so I looked at some symposium 
articles. The whole question of poverty and that variable really complicates 
the narrative because it is hard to tease that out and look at racism 
independent of poverty. Interaction between racism and poverty, racism 
causing poverty, and poverty causing racism is very complicated.26  So it 
just makes the narrative more difficult. 
One of the things that I found very surprising is that the narrative was 
not as widespread as I expected. Going into this, my hypothesis—I do not 
know if it was because of my own biases—was that there was going to be a 
lot of discourse about this racial issue. While there was some, I was really 
surprised at the small number of pictures. I mean there were thousands of 
pictures in the database for Katrina but relatively few that deal with the 
issue of racism. I was a little surprised by that. And, there was not as much 
academic literature [as I expected] as well. 
                                                                                                     
 22. See id. at 26. 
 23. See Harold A. McDougall, Hurricane Katrina:  A Story of Race, Poverty, and 
Environmental Injustice, 51 HOW. L.J. 533, 541 (2008) (“The federal government 
concentrated public housing in segregated inner-city neighborhoods, subsidized metropolitan 
sprawl, and failed to create affordable housing for low-income families and minorities in 
rapidly developing suburbs, cutting them off from decent housing and educational, and 
economic opportunities.”). 
 24. See id.  
 25. See, e.g., Audrey McFarlane, Fighting for the High Ground:  Race, Class, Markets 
and Development Done Right in Post Katrina Recovery, 14 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & 
SOC. JUST. 77, 80−82 (2007) (“Race continues to remain relevant as a shorthand 
measurement of who is friend or foe, guilty or innocent, worthy of attention or 
indifference.”). 
 26. See id. at 81–82. 
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I am using the racial narrative as a pivot to go over into the cultural 
issues. Part one is the insurance perspective. Part two is this cultural 
perspective. Let me give you a little background first. What do I mean by 
culture? This is a hard thing to define and entirely controversial. For me, it 
is a collective set of beliefs that convey meaning—the way we interpret the 
world, collectively, as groups. It involves norms, it involves shared beliefs, 
it involves music, literature, all kinds of things, and it includes law. Law is 
a cultural phenomenon, and I have just a couple of examples here. One is 
this idea of rights—individual rights, human rights, those are very 
important in American culture and they are very important in American 
law. We have all these laws that relate to rights, enforcing rights, 
recognized rights. That is a way of giving meaning to certain kinds of 
behavior and to certain kinds of privileges that we have. We give meaning 
to them by our collective understanding of them as being important human 
rights. 
Procedures also are a way of giving meaning. They give meaning to 
the notions of fairness and to justice, that there should be neutrality. We 
don’t have to necessarily have neutrality as a procedure—we could have 
some other kind of system, we could have a religiously-based system that 
would not be neutral, but we believe in neutrality, and that’s our collective 
belief that informs our procedures and our procedures inform our beliefs. 
The last point I want to make is that this is incredibly complex. There 
is a dynamism that exists with culture that institutions create culture and 
culture creates institutions. So, law will shape our beliefs and our beliefs 
will shape our laws.27  So there is this interactive dynamic which makes it 
very hard to unravel, but also suggests that relationship is extremely 
important. That is kind of the background. 
What I want to do is give you three cultural perspectives to think 
about, and to give us some opportunity to reflect on this issue of race. The 
first perspective is the most obvious one, and that is racism. What is the 
racism narrative? Well, the first point about racism as a cultural perspective 
is to identify that it has very deep, significant roots. The issue of race goes 
back to the founding of our country, the struggle of the founding fathers, 
and with slavery. I was in Washington, D.C. before coming here. I was at 
the Jefferson exhibit and there was a part of the Declaration of 
Independence that started to address this issue, and it was taken out as a 
                                                                                                     
 27. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Law, Lawyers and Popular Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 
1579, 1581 (1989) (“A social theory of law . . . insists instead that an analysis of social 
forces best explains why the legal system is as it is, what shapes and molds it . . . .”). 
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matter of compromise to avoid this slavery issue. They sort of set it aside; 
they never dealt with it.28 
Well they set it aside for a certain period of time, but by the time the 
Civil War comes, it is at the forefront. It is an incredibly difficult, decisive 
issue in American culture. From there, we have these other narratives that 
come out—this whole issue of being an Uncle Tom and Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin, the force of that piece of literature. Then, the protagonist who was 
written by a white author who is meant to be a very optimistic, a very good 
character29  is in fact now has turned into an archetype for a bad character.30  
Being an Uncle Tom is a bad thing within the black community. Next, there 
is the huge issue of rebellion that we see—this tenet of rebellion that comes 
from black power issues, the Black Panthers, the 60’s. Then, we see it now 
with gangster culture, rap, hip-hop culture, where we have this ongoing 
theme. Race in America is this huge issue and it is complicated and it has 
long and deep roots. We are not done with it. It is going to be a long time 
before we are. 
So what does that mean? To me, what it means is that there will be 
racial meanings all the time. We will see racial meanings about disasters 
that have disparate impact. We just see it from a racial standpoint. It is bi-
directional; it’s not just one way. There are people who are victims, who 
believe they are victims because of racism. I am not saying this is not true, I 
am saying this is an interpretive process. Any time you have disaster with a 
disparate impact, you are going to have a racism narrative that comes out of 
that. But, it comes on the other side as well, where those in the majority, 
whites, will say that there is a racial narrative here that some of us may 
view as racism, but they view it as this community [that] brought it upon 
themselves. They did not prepare for it themselves, that’s the way “those” 
people are. There’s this racial narrative that comes from the other side as 
well. 
So, what’s my point about this? My real point is that racism is the root 
problem and that we should do stuff to try to address racism in disasters but 
recognize that there is still racism and that racism is the root problem, and 
it’s very complicated, very hard, and it requires cultural change. And, 
                                                                                                     
 28. THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE JEFFERSON PAPERS 1:426 (Julian Boyd ed., 1950). 
 29. See HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM’S CABIN (1852). 
 30. Uncle Tom Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www. 
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/uncle%20tom (last visited Mar. 1, 2013) (defining “Uncle 
Tom” as “a black who is overeager to win the approval of whites (as by obsequious behavior 
or uncritical acceptance of white values and goals)”) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. 
& SOC. JUST.). 
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cultural change takes generations, unfortunately. We should work at it, I do 
not mean to be overly pessimistic about it, but I want to identify it for what 
it is. So, that’s the most obvious, the biggest narrative. 
Let me give you a couple of other narratives. Narrative number two is 
American autonomy. One of the things that I have come to believe, I don’t 
know if it’s necessarily true but it’s a belief based on my experience 
overseas, is that Americans have this incredible belief in autonomy—that 
freedom of the individuals is extremely important31 and that we have these 
beliefs in the ability of the individual to overcome all obstacles.32  If you 
just have hard work, will, and a little bit of good luck, anyone came go from 
rags to riches; anyone can be successful.33  We have these extremely strong 
values that, as I say, go back to the founding of America. The Bill of Rights 
has this notion of individual freedoms, that skepticism of government is a 
way to protect individual freedoms.34  When we expanded and settled the 
west, there was this strong narrative of overcoming nature, the notion of the 
American dream, which is actually not really true, but it is still a strong 
cultural belief that anyone can achieve success in America.35  Foreigners 
believe it as well.36 
So the example I wanted to use from popular culture is Mission 
Impossible—how many of you saw the latest Mission Impossible movie?37  
It is a blockbuster movie, millions of people saw it.38  The protagonist, Tom 
Cruise who plays Ethan Hunt, he overcomes all odds. The government 
abandons him and through his use of technology and his teammates, and 
mostly through his power of his will, he manages to save the world. This 
“save the world” narrative through individual choices is an extremely 
                                                                                                     
 31. See, e.g., ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART:  INDIVIDUALISM AND 
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (2008). 
 32. See, e.g., MARGARET MEAD, AND KEEP YOUR POWDER DRY:  AN ANTHROPOLOGIST 
LOOKS AT AMERICA 193 (1967). 
 33. See, e.g., MICHAEL RYAN, CULTURAL STUDIES:  A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION 65 
(2010). 
 34. See, e.g., PATRICK M. GARRY, LIMITED GOVERNMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
(2012). 
 35. See LARRY L. NAYLOR, AMERICAN CULTURE:  MYTH AND REALITY OF A CULTURE 
OF DIVERSITY 58 (1998). 
 36. See JAMES M. JASPER, RESTLESS NATION:  STARTING OVER IN AMERICA xii (2000). 
 37. MISSION IMPOSSIBLE:  GHOST PROTOCOL (Paramount Pictures 2011). 
 38. The world-wide gross receipts for Mission Impossible:  Ghost Protocol were more 
than $694 million as of April 12, 2012. See Box office/Business for Mission Impossible:  
Ghost Protocol, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1229238/business?ref_=tt_dt_bus (last 
visited on Mar. 1, 2013) (on file with WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.). 
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common, popular culture narrative that comes out of American culture.39  
And, that’s just one recent example of it. 
So, what is the point of my narrative here? What am I saying about 
risks and disaster? What I am saying is, we as Americans are more risk-
takers than people in other countries. We believe that it is okay because I 
can make my own way in the world. It is okay to take a risk; it is okay to go 
without insurance. If we are going to solve this problem, it runs afoul, 
contrary to a very core, fundamental value. This is a narrative that comes 
very strongly out of this disparate health care research. I think that 
American culture is not very sympathetic to that because it’s like well, take 
care of yourself. If you don’t have a good diet, eat better, educate yourself, 
go to the doctor—that’s all sort of an individual autonomy narrative. It is 
going to be very hard to tell people “you need to eat better” because that is 
contrary to American thinking. 
I’ve got a couple of quick statistics. There are international statistics 
about insurance density and insurance penetration. Insurance density is the 
per capita spending on insurance.40  America is ranked thirteenth.41  Well, 
that is pretty high, but we have the largest economy in the world.  Japan, 
Switzerland, Sweden are all above us.42  Switzerland is almost twice as 
much spending as an average American.43 
Penetration is the percentage of GDP that goes into insurance.44  In 
America, it is eight percent,45 which is about average of the developed 
world.46  Taiwan is eighteen percent,47 again, more than twice as high as the 
U.S. South Korea eleven percent,48 Bahamas, which is sort of weird—why 
Bahamas is an insurance place, is ten percent.49  The point I want to make at 
the bottom is this includes health insurance.50  In a great deal of the 
developed world, health insurance is a government program. It is not 
                                                                                                     
 39. See, e.g., BRADFORD W. WRIGHT, COMIC BOOK NATION:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
YOUTH CULTURE IN AMERICA (2001). 
 40. SWISS REINSURANCE, SIGMA:  WORLD INSURANCE IN 2010 30 (2011). 
 41. Id. at 38. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 20. 
 45. Id. at 39. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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insurance. In America, it is private insurance. Well, there is a big 
government program to be fair—Medicaid and Medicare are really big,51 
but there is a huge segment of it that is private insurance. So our insurance 
numbers are inflated because of our using private money to buy health 
insurance, whereas in most of the developed world, that’s not true. 
Here are the numbers on flood insurance—fifty percent of people in 
flood plains, flood-hazard areas, have flood insurance on their homes.52  
Seventy-five to eighty percent have it when it is mandatory,53 that means 
twenty-five percent do not have it when it is mandatory. When is it 
mandatory? Any time you get federal money, the federal law says you have 
to buy flood insurance.54  It improved it, but it’s still a pretty low take-up 
rate. In poor neighborhoods, homes valued at $50,000 or less, [there is a] 
thirty-six percent take-up rate.55  That is a seventy-four percent uninsured 
rate. Now, we might explain that by virtue of the cost, except that it is 
subsidized. The actual cost of insurance is fifty percent subsidized by the 
government,56 so it is actually a below-cost figure, and nobody really knows 
the answer to this—why people don’t buy flood insurance. Regular 
insurance agents can sell it, they can get a commission for it,57 the 
consumers just don’t buy it.  When you ask people why they don’t have it, 
they say, “well because I didn’t think I needed it,” even though they’re in a 
flood plain. I think that what it shows is we are risk-takers. That Americans 
have an autonomy narrative that we can make our way on our own. 
So the other two points were that we have mandatory insurance for 
auto insurance. Thirteen percent are uninsured, nationally.58  In some states, 
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it is as high as twenty-five percent.59  For health insurance, seventeen 
percent of Americans are uninsured.60  Millions and millions of people are 
uninsured for health insurance in America,61  which is the big deal about the 
health insurance reform and all that. But, the point is we, as Americans, 
choose not to buy insurance. There’s a risk-taking narrative here that I think 
is pretty strong. 
The third perspective is an anti-government narrative. Americans just 
don’t trust the government.62  We just don’t. We don’t trust the government 
more than the Chinese don’t trust the government. We don’t trust the 
government way more than Europeans. Separation of powers, federalism—
why do we have those? Because we don’t trust the government. Why is 
America the only country in the world that has the jury system? It started in 
England, they abandoned it. We have it. Why? We don’t trust the 
government. That mistrust runs very heavily through the 20s, 30s, 40s, 
prohibition, gangster times, it was heightened by Vietnam and Watergate, 
so then we have Iran-Contra, all these other scandals. And, it’s very 
common in popular culture. The point is that we will always have, in my 
opinion, a government screw-up narrative, out of any disaster. It could be 
the military shooting blacks in the street, it could be FEMA not giving, or 
corruption and abuse. We will always have a government screw-up 
narrative because that’s part of our society, part of our culture. We criticize 
the government. It is one of the things that makes the government strong, 
because it is subject to criticism and has to be reformed. Every time we 
have a disaster, there’s going to be this narrative coming out, and it could 
have a racial piece to it or not have a racial piece to it. 
All of that being said, now I’m back to the picture. What does this 
picture tell us now, in light of those perspectives? We talked about the 
racial piece, there could be a victimization thing, you could say, “yes, 
there’s a FEMA guy, a volunteer! Where’s the real FEMA guy? This guy 
has no authority. He’s being paid $10 an hour to come and help out. He’s 
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not doing anything. We need people with authority to be there!” That could 
be the racial narrative. It could be the victimization of blacks in the Ninth 
Ward as a racial narrative. 
What about the autonomy narrative? This guy didn’t buy insurance! 
Why didn’t he buy insurance? I don’t know the answer to that. There could 
be a racial explanation, it could be racism. There’s this whole thing. You 
may have heard of red-lining, it’s an old, archaic term. It means that in 
certain neighborhoods, there was actually a red line drawn around the 
neighborhood and insurance companies wouldn’t sell inside the red line. 
They tended to be poor, minority neighborhoods. That could be part of the 
explanation. That’s one narrative. 
What about the government screw-up narrative? This guy from FEMA 
is walking around, not doing anything. They didn’t really fix it very well. 
The Ninth Ward is still not really fixed properly because of government 
screw-ups. 
All of those narratives are there. So, what I’m really after here, this is 
the whole problem with cultural perspectives is that we are, as lawyers, 
trained to be problem-solvers. We want to see the problem, we want to 
identify it, and we want to solve the problem. What we’re about is 
solutions. Unfortunately, this cultural approach is not about solutions, but 
more about understanding, understand[ing] better what’s going on, and to 
draw on our historical antecedents.63 
The disaster [narratives] are important and certainly relevant, but I’m 
trying to talk more broadly, to say what are our cultural values, how do 
these values play into these narratives, and what does that tell us about 
ourselves as Americans. I hope that’s been helpful, I hope that’s been 
useful. I hope you see the picture and the narrative slightly different now 
having talked some of the cultural perspective. 
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